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ABSTRACT 
We synthesize the literature on Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) and find that much of 
the prior research is based on as few as a dozen case studies of Chinese firms. They are so case-
specific that it has led to a misplaced call for new theories to explain Chinese firms’ 
internationalization. In an attempt to better relate theory with empirical evidence, we examine 
the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms. We aim to find out the number of Chinese 
manufacturing firms to be true MNEs by definition, and to examine their financial performance 
relative to global peers using the financial benchmarking method. We develop our theoretical 
perspectives from new internalization theory. We find that there are only 49 Chinese 
manufacturing firms to be true MNEs, whereas the rest is purely domestic firms. Their 
performance is poor relative to global peers. Chinese MNEs have home country bound firm-
specific advantages (FSAs), which are built upon home country-specific advantages (home 
CSAs). They have not yet developed advanced management capabilities through recombination 
with host CSAs. Essentially, they acquire foreign firms to increase their sales in domestic 
market, but they fail to be competitive internationally and to achieve superior performance in 
overseas operations. Our findings have important strategic implications for managers, public 
policy makers, and academic research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of leading Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) such as Huawei, Lenovo, 
and Haier has stimulated academic research on the internationalization of Chinese MNEs. These 
include research on the driving forces of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
(Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Erdener & Shapiro, 2005; Liu, Buck, & Shu, 
2005; Luo & Wang, 2012); entry mode strategy (Cui & Jiang, 2010, 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, & 
Zhang, 2014); cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (Deng, 2009; Sun, Peng, Ren, & 
Yan, 2012); and China’s home country institutions (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Lu, Liu, Wright, & 
Filatotchev, 2014; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012).  
A number of scholars argue that emerging economy MNEs (EMNEs) in general and 
Chinese MNEs in particular are major players challenging MNEs from advanced economies 
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 2008; Zeng & Williamson, 2007). Others argue that this claim is 
exaggerated and based on biased selective anecdotal evidence (Collinson & Rugman, 2007; 
Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012). Jormanainen and Koveshnikov (2012) suggest that scholars 
need to be cautious when generalizing from these specific cases because these firms are so rare, 
and their behaviours and experience may not be representative for the entire population of 
EMNEs. In fact, these firms are ‘outliers’ (Collinson & Rugman, 2007; Narula, 2006). In a 
related manner, Peng, Sun, and Blevins (2011) call for the social responsibility of international 
business (IB) scholars to rectify the exaggeration of Chinese OFDI portrayed by Western media.  
Due to unique characteristics of Chinese MNEs and their internationalization patterns, a 
number of scholars argue that allegedly the traditional IB theories are not sufficient to explain 
the internationalization of Chinese MNEs (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Filatotchev, Strange, 
Piesse, & Lien, 2007). New theories have been developed using a few case studies and anecdotal 
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evidence (Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). Others argue that Chinese MNEs do not need 
firm-specific advantages (FSAs), i.e., proprietary internal strengths of MNEs relative to rivals, to 
embark on internationalization (Hashai & Buckley, 2014; Hong, Wang, & Kafouros, 2015). On 
the other hand, Narula (2012) argues that the current theories are sufficient, in which EMNEs 
behave similarly to MNEs based in developed countries, only that they have different sets of 
country-specific and firm-specific assets. Thus, the current literature lacks common theoretical 
grounds and convincing empirical evidence (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012).  
Despite the large volume of literature on Chinese OFDI, little is known about the 
financial performance of Chinese MNEs in international markets. Some studies examine sales 
growth and internationalization process through M&As as evidence of success stories of Chinese 
MNEs’ globalization (Liu, 2007; Matthews, 2006). These examples include Lenovo (Liu, 2007; 
Liu & Buck, 2009; Quelch & Knoop, 2006); Huawei (Hong & Sun, 2006; Luo, Cacchione, 
Junkunc, & Lu, 2011); Haier (Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Mathews, 2007; Du, 2003; Duysters, 
Jacob, Lemmerns, & Yu, 2009; Palepu, Khanna, & Vargas, 2005; Liu & Li, 2002), and the 
Wanxiang Group (Warner, Hong, & Xu, 2004).  
Given that the literature on Chinese MNEs is based on a few case studies and anecdotal 
evidence, it will be interesting to find out the number of Chinese manufacturing firms to be true 
MNEs. An MNE is defined as a firm with at least 10 percent of annual sales in foreign markets 
and three foreign subsidiaries (Rugman, 1981). Furthermore, there is scarce evidence on the 
financial performance of Chinese MNEs, particularly the performance of their overseas 
operations. Against this background, Rugman & Nguyen (2014) suggest that the financial 
performance of Chinese MNEs should be benchmarked relative to global peers rather left in the 
limbo of the literature of EMNEs. In this study, we aim to address two research questions: 
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1. To what extent are the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms to be true MNEs by 
definition?  
2. How is the financial performance of Chinese manufacturing MNEs relative to their 
global peers? 
To explain the performance of Chinese MNEs, we develop our theoretical perspectives 
from the insights of new internalization theory, which is an extension of internalization theory. 
The MNE expands internationally by establishing a network of foreign subsidiaries rather than 
by exporting or licensing (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981). According 
to Rugman and Verbeke (1992), some forms of FSAs are location-bound. We argue that many 
large Chinese firms’ FSAs are bound to home country-specific advantages (home CSAs) 
(Rugman & Nguyen, 2014; Rugman, Nguyen, & Wei, 2014; Verbeke, 2013; Voss, Buckley, & 
Ross, 2009). For this reason, they have difficulty in transferring their FSAs across borders due to 
their home location-specific characteristics. They have not yet developed new advanced 
management capabilities through recombination with host CSAs. Thus, they fail to achieve 
superior financial performance in their overseas operations relative to global peers. We examine 
this idea using a new original dataset of the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, and the 
industry financial data from OnceSource Global Business Browse by Thomson Reuters.  
We have made several important contributions to the literature. First, we find that among 
the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, there are only 49 Chinese firms to be true MNEs. 
The rest is purely domestic firms. After more than one decade of ‘going global’, most of the 
largest Chinese manufacturing firms remain oriented to large domestic market. Peng et al. (2011) 
use macro-level data and find a relatively small amount of Chinese OFDI. We analyze firm-level 
data and we find that there are relatively few Chinese firms to be true MNEs. 
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Second, we use the financial benchmarking, which is a well-established method in 
management accounting and financial management to compare the performance of large 
manufacturing Chinese MNEs relative to global peers using the industry financial data for the 
period between 2008 and 2012. These include five-year sales growth, five-year net profit margin, 
return on asset (ROA), total-debt-to-equity, current ratio, and quick ratio. The financial 
benchmarking is explained in the methodology section. We find that large manufacturing 
Chinese MNEs have significantly poor financial performance relative to global peers. We 
confirm this finding by analyzing the most frequently studied Chinese MNEs in the existing 
literature. Overall, we find that the literature exaggerates the internationalization and foreign 
success of Chinese MNEs. Furthermore, our work using the financial benchmarking method is a 
timely response to the call by finance scholars to integrate contemporary finance into IB research 
(Agmon, 2006; Bowe, Filatotchev, & Marshall, 2010; Oxelheim, Randoy, & Stonehill, 2001, 
2012). 
Third, we contribute to the current debate in the literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012): to 
what extent does the traditional IB theory explain the internationalization and performance of 
Chinese MNEs? Our theoretical development from new internalization theory (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 1992, 2001; Verbeke, 2013) is consistent with home country institution view and home 
country-bounded nature of Chinese MNEs’ FSAs (Luo et al., 2010; Rugman, 2009). We show 
that new internalization theory has robust explanatory power to address this research 
phenomenon. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the second section reviews the extant 
literature. The third section presents new internalization theory, which is the theoretical 
foundation of our study. The fourth section presents empirical work, in which we describe the 
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source of data and the research methodology. Then, we show our findings. The fifth section 
discusses and interprets the findings, and presents the conclusions and implications. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON CHINESE MNEs 
The Literature is Based on as Few as a Dozen Case Studies 
We have carefully examined the literature on Chinese MNEs in the international management 
and international business journals, edited volumes, and books published between 2000 and 
2014, since China initiated its ‘go global’ policy which promotes overseas investment in 2000. 
We focus on papers presenting either conceptual models or case studies which have been 
published in leading journals according to Association of Business School (ABS) Academic 
Journal Guide. These include the Journal of International Business Studies; Journal of World 
Business; International Business Review; Management International Review; Academy of 
Management Journal; Management and Organization Review; Journal of International 
Management; Global Strategy Journal; Asia Pacific Journal of Management.  
Paradoxically, the literature has focused only on a small number of high profile Chinese 
firms. Thus, it provides us little insight into the international activities of the majority of Chinese 
firms. Table 1 reports 10 Chinese firms which are the most frequently studied in the extant 
literature, arranged by their foreign (F) to total (T) sales (F/T) ratio for 2012 (column 2), and its 
related key financial ratios relative to the industry financial data (columns 5 and 6). 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Home Country Institution and Chinese OFDI 
The home country institution perspective, which is an extension of the institution-based view, 
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has been widely applied to examine Chinese OFDI (Deng, 2009; Luo et al., 2010; Voss et al., 
2009). From a macro-economic perspective, the surge of Chinese OFDI has been attributed to 
public policies and support by Chinese government in encouraging domestic firms to go abroad 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Cross et al., 2007). From a micro-economic level, Chinese MNEs’ 
internationalization strategy, such as resource-driven M&As, location choices, and the ownership 
structure of foreign subsidiaries are mingled with various home country institutional incentives 
(Cui & Jiang 2012; Rui & Yip 2008; Wang et al., 2012; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011).  
Chinese government’s support and the role of state ownership, which is a type of Chinese 
CSAs, confer Chinese firms resource advantages in their OFDI, thus compensate for their lack of 
intangible knowledge-based FSAs. It is argued that the internationalization may enhance Chinese 
firms’ capabilities to take risks abroad (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2010). Government 
support and artificially cheap credit have greatly increased Chinese firms’ purchasing power in 
international M&As (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Gammeltoft, Barnard, & Madhok, 2010; Luo et 
al., 2010). Luo and Tung (2007) develop the springboard view, which argues that Chinese firms 
use OFDI, especially through M&As of Western MNEs, as a springboard to seek access to 
sophisticated resources to compensate for their latecomer disadvantages, to mitigate domestic 
institutional disadvantages, and to secure preferential treatment from home governments.  
The common assumption in the current literature is that strategic-asset-seeking FDI, 
which aim to acquire technology capabilities, global brand, distribution networks, and 
management expertise is a dominant motive for Chinese M&As. The literature focuses mainly on 
the benefits that Chinese firms gain from such investments (e.g., Klossek, Linke, & Nippa, 2012; 
Wang & Boateng, 2007). However, there are relatively few studies examining the costs of such a 
strategy. Peng (2012) casts doubt on Chinese firms’ overseas acquisitions in their pre-acquisition 
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and post-acquisition phases as they lack experience and fail to undertake due diligence. Rugman 
et al. (2014) find that less than half of the announced foreign acquisitions of Chinese firms have 
been successfully completed. 
  
Chinese MNEs’ Performance is a Mystery  
The financial performance of Chinese MNEs has been under-researched in the extant literature. 
This is probably due to the fact that Chinese OFDI is a relatively new phenomenon, and its long-
term performance is not understood (Peng, 2012). Previous studies find that post-acquisition 
integration challenges constrain the success of most cross-border M&As (Shimizu, Hitt, 
Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). Chinese firms could be more vulnerable due to their lack of FSAs, 
especially the absence of systems integration and internal managerial coordination (Peng, 2012; 
Rugman, 2009).  
The dominant view is that the acquired foreign assets enable Chinese firms to access 
foreign markets and compete with other MNEs (Liu, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007; Rui & Yip, 
2008). However, there is little evidence to support this claim. A number of studies examine the 
internationalization process and sales patterns of Chinese firms, which are viewed as evidence of 
their globalization and international success (Liu, 2007; Matthews, 2006). We show 
subsequently that sales are not necessarily an indicator of financial stability and sustainability.  
 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
New Internalization Theory  
Internalization theory explains the existence of the MNE when it achieves multinationality 
through the creation of internal markets to replace missing external intermediate markets. The 
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MNE is particularly good at overcoming the public good externality of knowledge by 
substituting its internal market, and using substitutions to transfer tacit knowledge across 
national borders. The MNE needs to possess FSAs relative to local firms, which should outweigh 
the costs and risks of doing business abroad due to the liabilities of foreignness (Hymer, 1960; 
Zaheer, 1995). The MNE establishes property rights over its FSAs so that they would not be 
dissipated to other firms (Rugman, 1981). In other words, the MNE transfers, deploys, exploits, 
and protects its FSAs through the use of foreign subsidiaries which monitor, meter, and regulate 
the use of FSAs abroad (Rugman, 1981; Rugman, Verbeke, & Nguyen, 2011). Overall, 
internalization theory focuses on the efficiency aspects of the MNE (Buckley & Casson, 1976; 
Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981). 
Rugman and Verbeke (1992) develop the concepts of non-location bound and location-
bound FSAs (NLB and LB FSAs). The former can be internationally transferred with low costs 
and little adaptation, and can be deployed and exploited in both home and host countries, and 
brings the benefits of economy of scale, scope and integration. The latter is bound to a particular 
location, a country, or a set of countries, or a region and brings the benefits of national 
responsiveness. Rugman and Verbeke (2001) demonstrate that FSAs can be developed not only 
by parent firms in the home country (parent-firm FSAs) but also by foreign subsidiaries in host 
countries (subsidiary-specific advantages SSAs). Previous literature documents that subsidiaries 
have created new capabilities and competencies in recombination with host CSAs (Andersson, 
Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Birkinshaw, 2000; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). Rugman and Verbeke 
(1992, 2001) refer to this contribution as new internalization theory. 
Verbeke (2013) advances three types of FSAs. These are stand-alone FSAs through 
recombination with home CSAs; routines and codification; and recombination capability leading 
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to tacit knowledge, which is the highest-order FSA. The recombination capability requires the 
firm not only to transfer abroad its existing set of FSAs developed by parent firms, but also to 
create new knowledge-based FSAs through the recombination with host CSAs. Such 
recombination of tacit knowledge requires that MNE managers meld home and host CSAs with 
FSAs held by geographically dispersed MNE units, and develop novel recombinations (Rugman, 
et al., 2011; Verbeke, 2013). Hennart (2009, 2012) states that such recombinations of FSAs and 
host CSAs is very difficult to achieve, since local (host country) resources are monopolized by 
local firms and are not freely accessible. This constrains and inhibits market entry and expansion 
of EMNEs (Hennart, 2009).  
 
New Internalization Theory and Chinese OFDI  
We argue that the types of FSAs which Chinese firms may possess are built upon home CSAs 
and deeply embedded in Chinese institutional environments (Rugman et al., 2014; Wei, 2010). 
These include low-cost labour; large home market size; artificially cheap and implicitly 
subsidized debt capital; national innovation system; privileged access to government 
relationships and networks; state ownership and national champion identities; dominant control 
and access to local input resources in domestic networks and output markets in China (Buckley, 
2014; Luo & Wang, 2012; Rui & Yip, 2008; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014; Rugman et al., 2014). In 
other words, Chinese firms have developed home country-bound FSAs, which is a type of stand-
alone FSAs by Verbeke (2013)’s definition. For this reason, it is very difficult for Chinese firms 
to transfer their FSAs across borders due to home country-specific characteristics (Rugman et al., 
2014).  
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Yet, reliance on home country CSAs might slow down or even impede Chinese firms to 
invest and to develop knowledge-based intangible types of FSAs. Managers interpret home 
country CSAs and past experience in local markets as a rationale for the existing success 
formulae. However, this success may restrain organizational learning when Chinese firms 
venture internationally. They may become less open to learning from new experiences, and less 
prepared for adaptations to new demands, and new requirements in international business 
environments outside China. They may become less motivated to adapt their organizational 
routines, business systems, and practices to accommodate to host country conditions. They may 
become less ready to innovate and thereby develop knowledge-based FSAs. Consequently, they 
find it difficult to turn opportunities in international markets into superior financial performance 
results for overseas operations.  
This phenomenon is akin to what March (1991) calls a ‘success trap’, defined as the 
focus on the exploitation of (historically successful) current business activities and as such 
neglect the need of exploration of new opportunities and enhancement of long-term viability. 
This has also been known as the ‘competency trap’ (Levinthal & March, 1993). The competency 
trap implies that learning from experiences favors exploitation behavior, in which business 
practices become focused on well-known alternatives, underestimating the potential benefits of 
the unknown (March, 1991). Firms come to over-rely on past experiences and do not adjust for 
new challenges, which are self-destructive behaviour. 
In a related manner, Hennart (2012) argues that EMNEs in general derive significant 
gains from the monopoly of home CSAs. They use this monopoly power to finance intangible-
seeking investments in developed countries to obtain FSAs they lack and hence compete with 
FSA-rich MNEs in domestic and international markets (Hennart, 2012). Our theoretical 
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perspectives are also in line with home country institution based view (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Voss, Rhodes, & Zheng, 2008). 
Chinese MNEs have developed mainly home country-bound FSAs, then how do they 
integrate acquired strategic assets in foreign markets and turn them into sustainable FSAs? Due 
to a short period of internationalization, Chinese MNEs still lack integration capabilities and 
savvy managerial talents, which give us little confidence that they are capable of integrating 
foreign acquisitions to develop anything resembling tacit knowledge recombination capabilities 
in host economies (Fan, Nyland, & Zhu, 2008; Peng, 2012; Rugman, 2007). Furthermore, the 
inefficient and centralized governance structure associated with state ownership (Chen & Young, 
2010; Globerman & Shapiro, 2009) may reduce the willingness of Chinese parent firms to give 
autonomy to foreign subsidiaries to develop FSAs in host countries. In other words, Chinese 
MNEs have not developed recombination capabilities, which are the highest-order FSAs. 
Consequently, they find it very challenging to achieve superior financial performance in their 
overseas operations, because FSAs are key determinants of performance, not multinationality per 
se (Morck & Yeung, 1991; Nguyen, 2011; Rugman, 1981; Rugman & Verbeke, 2008; Verbeke 
& Brugman, 2009). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources and Sample  
Our new original dataset of the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms comes from China 
Enterprise Confederation and China Enterprise Directors Association. We examine these firms’ 
annual reports, together with other stock market documents (e.g., prospectuses and various 
announcements) to obtain their financial data (sales, geographic segments, and number of foreign 
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subsidiaries). We exclude 136 Chinese manufacturing firms from the dataset due to the 
unavailability of annual reports. We have a remaining of 364 Chinese firms. 
Our financial benchmarking of Chinese manufacturing MNEs’ performance relative to 
the industry financial data (peer group analysis) comes from OnceSource Global Business 
Browser. It is one of the leading financial intelligence commercial databases provided by 
Thomson Reuters, Reuters Research Inc., and published by Avention Inc.  
 
Financial Benchmarking 
Financial benchmarking is defined as the establishment by the collection of data of comparators 
which allow relative levels of performance to be identified (Drury, 2009; Seal, Garrison, & 
Norren, 2011). Financial benchmarking is a well-established method in the fields of management 
accounting and financial management, and it has been widely adopted by MNEs in business 
reality. Financial benchmarking uses financial information most often in the form of ratios and 
metrics to perform these comparisons (Drury, 2009; Seal et al., 2011). When benchmarks are 
used, the main question is: what is the average level of performance for a given ratio and metric 
in a specific industry?  
One method of benchmarking is peer group analysis. For example, the North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS), which is a product of the US Office of Management 
and Budget, serves as methods of identifying potential peers in the same industry for 
comparisons. Firms with the same NAICS codes are identified. The financial ratios and metrics 
from a group of peers in the same industry are generated, which is known as industry financial 
data benchmark. Once the benchmark is established, we can compare financial ratios of a 
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particular company relative to the industry financial data or two firms operating in the same 
industry (Drury, 2009; Seal et al., 2011).  
 
Industry Financial Data 
We use OnceSource database to collect financial data of Chinese manufacturing firms identified 
as true MNEs, and the industry financial data. We contact the Support Centre of OneSource 
(operated by Avention Inc.) to obtain a document called ‘Risk Management Association (RMA) 
Industry Norms Data Dictionary’. According to OneSource, the industry financial data are 
provided by the RMA, which is the most respected source of objective and unbiased information 
on issues of importance to credit risk professionals. RMA has generated the RMA Annual 
Statement Studies, which have been the industry standard for comparison of financial data for 
over 85 years. Today, the RMA features data for over 740 industries (OneSource, 2013).  
The RMA has used more than 269,000 financial statements to produce the composite 
financial data. The financial data come directly from RMA member institutions and represent the 
financials from their commercial customers and prospects (OneSource, 2013). In order to ensure 
confidentiality, company names are removed before the data is delivered to RMA. The raw data 
making up each composite is not available to any third party (OneSource, 2013).  
The RMA’s Annual Statement Studies generate Financial Ratio Benchmarks. RMA 
shows balance sheet and income statement information in common size format, with each item a 
percentage of total assets and sales. RMA computes common size statements for each individual 
statement in an industry group, and then aggregates and averages all the figures. A minus sign 
beside the value indicates credits and losses (OneSource, 2013).  
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Data is organized into industry in accordance with the NAICS. A NAICS code may 
correspond to more than one Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), so there may be several 
SICs listed. If a NAICS code maps to more than three SIC codes, only the first three SICs will be 
listed at the top of the page, with all corresponding SIC codes found in the NAICS description 
index (OneSource, 2013). When there are fewer than 10 financial statements in a particular asset 
or sales size category, the composite data is not displayed because a sample this small is not 
considered representative and could be misleading.  
 
Measurements  
Degree of internationalization. An MNE is defined as a firm which is headquartered in one 
country but having operations in other countries (Rugman, 1981). An MNE must have a ratio of 
foreign sales over total sales (F/T) at 10 percent and three foreign subsidiaries (Rugman, 1981). 
The threshold of 10 percent F/T comes from international accounting standards, such as IFRS8-
Operating Segments (for firms’ reporting in compliance with IFRS), and SFAS No. 131, FASB-
Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information (for firms’ reporting in 
compliance with US GAAP). 
Foreign sales ratio is measured by foreign sales over total sales (F/T), which has been 
widely used to measure the degree of internationalization (Hennart, 2011; Li, 2007a; Ruigrok, 
Amann, & Wagner, 2007). The F/T data which we use in our study is determined by the way 
Chinese firms report in their annual reports. When we analyze F/T ratio of Chinese firms, we 
carefully consult their accounting policies and disclosure notes. We find that Chinese firms 
define foreign sales as sales outside Mainland China and they report sales in Hong Kong and 
Macau as foreign sales. Foreign sales include both export sales by parent firms from China and 
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sales generated by their foreign subsidiaries through FDI in host countries. We used F/T data in 
2012 for the largest 500 Chinese manufacturers, with the only exception of Suntech. Suntech 
went bankrupt in 2011, and its annual report became unavailable since then. So, we had to use its 
data of the year 2011. 
 
Financial performance. We use multi-dimensional performance indicators, which measure 
growth, profitability, financial stability, and management effectiveness of Chinese MNEs 
(Rugman & Colinson, 2012). OnceSource provides financial performance data of average five-
year sales growth, five-year net profit margin, total debt-to-equity ratio, current ratio, quick ratio, 
and return on asset (ROA) of Chinese firms relative to the industry financial data. The average of 
five-year data neutralizes variance over time (OneSource, 2013).  
 
RESULTS 
The Majority of the Largest 500 Chinese Manufacturing Firms are Not MNEs 
We find that among the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, there are only 49 
manufacturing firms to be ‘true MNEs’ by a basic definition. Table 2 reports these 49 MNEs, 
which are ranked by their F/T ratio. The average F/T ratio of Chinese MNEs is approximately 29 
percent (including sales in Hong Kong and Macau). Many subsidiaries of these Chinese 
manufacturers (27 percent of total subsidiaries) are located in Hong Kong and Macau or both, 
and therefore are not really indicators of FDI. In addition, if Hong Kong and Macau sales were 
excluded, the F/T ratio of Chinese manufacturing firms would be lower and it is likely that there 
would be even fewer Chinese manufacturing MNEs. Furthermore, China, as one of the largest 
exporters in the world, has its domestic firms achieving foreign sales through exporting, as 
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exports are part of ‘foreign sales’, leaving little left for sales generated by foreign subsidiaries 
through FDI activities. In short, the majority of the largest Chinese manufacturing firms are 
purely domestic firms, not MNEs.  
Insert Table 2 here 
We examine these firms’ operations. Specifically, we identify firms operating in material 
and component manufacturing and those making final products (Table 2, last column). We find 
that out of the largest 49 Chinese manufacturing MNEs, the majority of them are final product 
manufacturers, accounting for 71 percent. Based on their F/T data, we find that the average F/T 
for final product manufacturers is 31 percent, while the average F/T for material and component 
manufacturers is 26 percent.  
We examine these firms’ sales by geographic segments (Table 2). Suntech is the only 
‘global’ company with more than 20 percent of its sales in all three regions of the broad triad of 
North America, Europe and Asia Pacific (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Ironically, this Chinese 
‘global’ firm underscores the point we make subsequently on the implications of poor financial 
performance of Chinese firms in their internationalization. In March 2013, Suntech was the first 
company from Mainland China to default on its US bonds payment of US$541 million (Morales 
& Martin, 2013). Subsequently, Suntech’s main unit, Wuxi Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd. 
was placed into insolvency as Chinese banks filed bankruptcy against Suntech (Goossens & 
Doom, 2013; Sui-Lee, 2013). The company's American Depository Receipts were delisted from 
the New York Stock Exchange and placed on the over the counter exchange. 
We compare F/T data of these Chinese manufacturing MNEs in 2008 and in 2012 (Table 
3). We find that there are no significant changes. Among 49 Chinese MNEs, there are 26 firms 
which have witnessed a decrease in foreign sales ratio in 2012 compared to 2008. Overall, 
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Chinese firms focus predominantly on their large Mainland China domestic market, and their 
foreign sales through FDI are very limited. One plausible explanation is that Chinese firms are 
unable to achieve foreign sales due to the nature of their home country-bound FSAs and the 
over-reliance on domestic market. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Our new finding here using a new dataset of large manufacturing firms is fully consistent 
with Rugman and Nguyen (2014), who find that there are only five MNEs out of the largest 73 
Chinese firms in the Fortune Global 500 in 2012. The rest are domestic firms. In addition, we 
find that the current literature suffers from a basic error. When a firm from an emerging country, 
especially from China, enters into the Fortune Global 500, it is automatically referred to as an 
MNE (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2010:10). This is not correct.  
We revisit Table 1 (column 2): out of the 10 most frequently studied Chinese firms in the 
extant literature, there are two firms, which are not MNEs, namely, Shanghai Automotive 
(SAIC) and Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC). The F/T ratio of SAIC is only 0.18 
percent, and AVIC has no foreign sales. Indeed, there are only seven firms which have been 
correctly identified as Chinese MNEs in the extant literature. They are Huawei, Lenovo, ZTE, 
BOE, TCL, Wanxiang, and Haier. Overall, we find that there are relatively few Chinese 
manufacturing firms to be MNEs.  
The literature on Chinese MNEs also uses other anecdotal evidence, such as Weiqiao 
Textile, Pearl River Piano, Ping An, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Bank of 
China, and Agriculture Bank of China (Hennart, 2012; Zeng & Williamson, 2007). However, a 
basic analysis of financial data from these firms’ annual reports shows that they are not MNEs by 
a basic definition. In other words, successful Chinese domestic firms (Williamson & Zeng, 2009; 
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Williamson & Rama, 2013; Zeng & Williamson, 2007) have been chronically misinterpreted as 
Chinese MNEs.  
 
Financial Benchmarking of Large Chinese Manufacturing MNEs Relative to Industry 
Financial Data 
We use data from OneSource to compare the financial performance of large Chinese 
manufacturing MNEs with the average industry financial data for the five-year period 2008–
2012 (Table 4). As such, the industry and time effects are controlled. We report the significant 
level by using paired samples two-tailed t-test (Table 5). We find that compared to the industry 
financial data, the financial performance of Chinese manufacturing MNEs is significantly lower 
across key financial performance metrics (average five-year net profit margin, return on asset 
ROA), and they have higher risk profiles in terms of financial stability (total debt-to-equity ratio, 
current ratio, and quick ratio). Once the basic key performance indicators are applied across 
Chinese manufacturing MNEs, it is highly unlikely that the case examples in the existing 
literature can be shown to have successful strategies and sustainable performance. 
Insert Table 4 and Table 5 here 
We revisit Table 1 (columns 4 and 5), in which Huawei, Lenovo, ZTE, TCL are often 
cited in the literature as evidence of Chinese MNEs’ successful internationalization. However, 
we find that the financial performance (profit and ROA) of these particular MNEs is lower 
relative to the industry financial data. For example, Huawei’s net profit margin for the five-year 
period is 6.98 percent compared to the industry financial data of 17.97 percent. Lenovo’s net 
profit margin is very thin at 1.86 percent, while the ratio for the industry financial data is nine 
times higher at 16.98 percent. Similarly, ZTE has been operating at a loss with a negative net 
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profit margin (3.13 percent) compared to the industry of 17.97 percent. The net profit margin for 
TCL is 2.29 percent compared to the industry of 3.84 percent. The only Chinese manufacturing 
MNE with a solid financial performance is Haier, because Haier focuses on Chinese domestic 
market where it has generated 90 percent of its total sales (Table 1).  
Some of the frequently studied Chinese firms (SAIC, ZTE, and TCL) rely heavily on debt 
financing as reflected in their total-debt-to-equity ratio. This is probably due to their access to 
easy, artificially cheap, and subsidized debt capital from state-owned banks with mandates to 
support national champion firms. The financing of large Chinese firms in general has been in the 
hands of sovereign wealth funds, which are state-owned investment funds (Bremmer, 2009).  
Our finding on the high level of debt in the capital structure of Chinese manufacturing 
MNEs relative to the industry financial data (Table 4) is fully consistent with theoretical 
arguments by Buckley (2014). He provides a comprehensive discussion on cheap credit (a type 
of Chinese CSAs). The access to low-cost credit might enable Chinese firms to internationalize 
by buying out Western firms in cross-border M&As. However, managing these financial 
resources effectively and efficiently to deliver superior performance results in overseas 
operations is another matter. This requires advanced international financial management skills, 
which Chinese firms need more time to develop. In short, Chinese firms have built their FSAs 
based upon home CSAs, but they have not yet developed advanced management skills in 
combination with host CSAs. The findings support our theoretical development in the earlier 
section. 
 
The International Strategy of Chinese Firms and its Impact on Performance 
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The literature has emphasized the global nature of Chinese giants, such as Lenovo, Huawei and 
ZTE. We find that Chinese manufacturing MNEs, which report their geographic segment sales, 
are actually home region oriented, with more than 50 percent of sales in their home region of the 
triad (Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). To be more precise, the majority of Chinese manufacturing 
MNEs are oriented to large home country domestic market in China. By focusing on the 
internationalization activities of the 10 most notable Chinese firms, and mainly their acquisitions 
of Western firms, the existing literature shows an inherent bias in exaggerating Chinese firms’ 
international success.  
It is argued that MNEs from emerging markets have strong absorption capacity, which 
allows them to recognize, to access, to develop new knowledge, and to combine these resources 
with cost innovation capabilities developed at home (Deng, 2007; Williamson & Zeng, 2009; 
Zeng & Williamson 2007). We show that the acquired strategic assets potentially enable Chinese 
firms to enhance their competitive position in China, but cannot sustain their success in overseas 
markets. We find that sales growth of Chinese manufacturing MNEs is mainly attributed to sales 
growth in domestic market, not in international markets. This is due to our careful analysis of 
Chinese firms’ sales by geographic segments and market share data by re-examination of the 
frequently-studied firms, and thus we can offer new insights. 
 
Re-examination of frequently-studied Chinese firms  
Lenovo. Lenovo has been used as an example of a promising Chinese MNE, with particular 
emphasis on its acquisition of IBM’s personal computer division. There is consensus in the 
literature that the acquisition has enabled Lenovo to build a global brand, and to reach global 
customers by using IBM’s brand, production lines, and management expertise, worldwide 
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distribution and sales networks (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Liu, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008; Zeng & Williamson, 2007). By taking IBM’s worldwide PC 
market share, Lenovo became the third largest PC manufacturer in the world in 2005. According 
to Gartner, Inc., Lenovo has been among the top five global companies in terms of worldwide 
PC vendor market share from 2005 to 2012.  
We find that Lenovo’s global market share is largely attributable to its leading position in 
China rather than in international markets. Lenovo’s foreign sales in Asia Pacific, Europe, and 
the Americas, compared to its total sales, have been shrinking since 2005 (Lenovo annual 
reports, various years). After the acquisitions, Lenovo experienced difficulty in maintaining 
IBM’s PC market share in the United States. Based on Gartner data, Lenovo is among the top 
five PC manufacturers in the US market in 2005 (the year Lenovo completed the purchase of 
IBM’s PC business). Since then Lenovo has dropped out of the top five in the US. It was not 
until 2012 that Lenovo reached the fifth place in the US market share.  
In contrast, Lenovo has increased significantly its domestic market share and its domestic 
sales ratio in China after the acquisition (Lenovo annual reports, various years). Our empirical 
findings show that the acquisition of the IBM’s PC division has not enabled Lenovo to succeed 
beyond its core home market. In the same vein, the five-year sales growth of Lenovo is only 
15.58 percent whereas the industry growth rate is 27.16 percent (Table 1).  
 
TCL. TCL acquired Schneider Electronics in 2002. TCL acquired French Thomson’s global 
colour TV business (branded RCA) and become the world’s largest TV producer. TCL acquired 
Alcatel’s global mobile phone business in 2004. TCL sells mainly the Thomson and Schneider 
brand in the European market and RCA brand TVs in North America (TCL, 2002, 2004). 
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However, due to financial difficulties of European operations, TCL Thomson Electronic (TTE) 
Europe has been downsized, and it was returned to Thomson in 2006 (TCL, 2006). At the same 
time, ongoing poor performance instigated the voluntary wind-up of Schneider Electronics in 
2011 (TCL, 2011). Although RCA has nine percent of the market share in the US market, it is 
perceived as old-fashioned and used mainly by elderly Americans (Bell, 2008).  
These acquisitions have not paved the way for TCL’s future international expansion. Its 
foreign sales in the North American and European markets decreased from 48 percent to 23 
percent of total sales between 2005 and 2008, while its domestic sales increased from 37 percent 
to 69 percent between 2005 and 2011 (TCL Annual report, various years). In other words, while 
TCL’s five-year sales growth of 12.25 percent is higher than the industry financial data of 3.71 
percent, it is attributable mainly to strong sales growth in Mainland China market, not in 
international markets (Table 1). 
 
Shanghai Automotive (SAIC). The acquisitions of MG Rover (UK) and SsangYong Motor (South 
Korea), which have been discussed intensively in the literature, have failed to make SAIC to be a 
true MNE. Only 0.18 percent of its total sales have been generated from foreign sales (Table 1). 
Furthermore, due to deterioration, South Korean SsangYong Motor went bankrupt and filed to 
restart operations in 2009 with Seoul Central District Court (SAIC, 2009).  
 
BOE. The literature highlights the acquisition by BOE Technology. For example, BOE acquires 
Korean firm HYDIS’s TFT-LCD production line, which has been cited to improve BOE’s 
technology and strengthen its global sales network and service system (Deng, 2007, 2009; Zeng 
& Williamson, 2007). However, due to operating difficulties, BOE HYDIS has applied for the 
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Legal Reorganization Procedure to Central District Court in 2006, and has lost control (BOE, 
2007). BOE generates much of its sales in Asian countries.  
 
Haier. Haier is another well-known example of Chinese firm’s internationalization with primary 
focus in the United States. Haier established facilities in an industrial park in South Carolina, a 
marketing venture in New York, and an R&D/design centre in Los Angeles, which aim to 
improve brand reputation, draw on local expertise in design and technology, and target local 
customers (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Duysters et al., 2009). It has been argued that Haier’s 
presence in the United States not only yields local market share, but also supports its investments 
in other countries (Deng, 2004, 2007). However, Haier’s foreign sales account for only 11.40 
percent of its total sales in 2012 (Table 1). If sales in Hong Kong and Macau were excluded from 
the calculation of foreign sales, Haier would be a home country-based firm, which generates the 
vast majority of its sales from domestic market in Mainland China (Table 1).  
 
Wanxiang Group. Wanxiang Group’s interest in the US market is evident by its acquisitions of 
several American companies, including Zeller Corporation, LT Company, UAI Company, GBC 
Company, PS Corporation, AI Company, and ACH. In 2013, Wanxiang obtained the US 
government’s approval to buy the bankrupt electric-car battery maker, A123 Systems, in order to 
enhance the technology that A123 has developed. With internationalization and strategic-asset 
acquisition, Wanxiang has expanded its foreign markets. However, its focus remains on China, 
as foreign sales account for only 15 percent of total sales in 2012 (Table 1). In short, our analysis 
of the most popular case studies of Chinese MNEs’ internationalization success stories in the 
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extant literature provides new interesting insights. We find that Chinese MNEs have achieved 
growth mainly in home country market, not in international markets. 
  
DISCUSSION 
Implications for Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
Our study reveals superficial thinking in much of the extant literature on Chinese MNEs’ 
internationalization and performance. We emphasize that the theory on the strategy of Chinese 
MNEs needs to be empirically validated in the performance of the firms (Rugman & Nguyen, 
2014). Furthermore, the literature based on 10 case studies and anecdotal evidence of Chinese 
firms has led to the misinterpretation of theories and misplaced call for new theories. We show 
that new internalization theory (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992, 2001; Verbeke, 2013) has fully 
robust explanatory power. Chinese MNEs have home country-bound FSAs, which are deeply 
embedded in home CSAs (Rugman & Li, 2007; Rugman et al., 2014; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014). 
They have difficulty in transferring these FSAs across borders. In addition, they have not yet 
developed advanced management capabilities in recombination with host CSAs. Thus, they fail 
to achieve superior financial performance in overseas operations.  
Interestingly, we find that among the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, there are 
only 49 to be true MNEs, whereas the rest is purely domestic firms. The financial performance of 
Chinese manufacturing MNEs is poor relative to global peers using financial benchmarking 
method with the industry financial data (peer group analysis). Because of the home country-
bound nature of FSAs, such as government support and the lack of recombination capabilities 
with host CSAs, Chinese MNEs are unable to explore and secure foreign markets by deploying 
and exploiting the newly acquired strategic assets. Their sales growth has been mainly attributed 
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to the success in domestic markets. Large Chinese manufacturing MNEs with OFDI activities, 
such as Lenovo, Huawei, and Haier might aim to increase their sales in international markets to 
gain global competitive positions. But, at least until now, they are only capable of growing by 
recombining their FSAs (including the foreign acquired assets) with China’s home CSAs, but not 
with host CSAs. Chinese MNEs’ FSAs built upon Chinese CSAs may give them the opportunity 
to develop new FSAs based on their foreign activities. Unfortunately, we still find little evidence 
that this has occurred. We suggest that going forward, the literature on Chinese MNEs needs to 
better align theory with empirical evidence.  
 
Implications for Practice 
Our findings provide important strategic implications for Chinese managers and public policy 
makers. Managerial effectiveness cannot tolerate a lack of focus on financial performance, which 
is critically important for firms’ survival in the short term and in the long term. Policy makers are 
recommended to implement effective controlling and monitoring mechanisms to prevent 
potential abuses of government resources, especially credit financing, which may lead to 
wasteful investments and corruption. Chinese government is recommended to encourage firms to 
develop internationally transferrable FSAs, such as technology, global brands, and managerial 
capabilities, because they ensure the sustainability of firms’ internationalization and 
performance. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Implications 
Our study has several limitations, which might open a new direction for future research. To 
address our research questions, we focus on the largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms, 
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because of the important role of manufacturing in China. We use the financial benchmarking 
method to examine the performance of Chinese manufacturing MNEs relative to global peers. 
However, we cannot test hypotheses using regression techniques. This is because we find that 
there are only 49 firms out of the largest 500 Chinese manufacturers to be true MNEs. With such 
a small sample size of 49 manufacturing MNEs, the results from a multiple regression undermine 
the reliability, and the resulting estimates of error are potentially unreliable and may under or 
overestimate the true error (Hair et al., 2010). We recommend that future research examine large 
Chinese service firms or a combination of service and manufacturing firms, identify the number 
of firms to be true MNEs, and compare and contrast the results with our findings. If the sample 
size of Chinese firms to be true MNEs is sufficiently large, it will be interesting to extend our 
study by using multivariate data analysis.  
Future research needs to be more cautious in interpreting domestic Chinese firms as 
MNEs. We find that the majority of the largest Chinese manufacturing firms are home country 
based as they rely heavily on domestic market for their sales activities. Although Chinese OFDI 
has attracted significant attention in academic literature, there is still inadequate research on 
financial performance of international operations of Chinese firms. First, we demonstrate that 
performance is not driven by multinationality, so it is incorrect to interpret Chinese firms as 
successful MNEs based on their foreign activities such as M&As.  
Second, we show that FSAs are key determinants of performance. On the one hand, 
Chinese firms are still lacking traditional Western types of FSAs (Hennart, 2012; Wei, 2010). 
One the other hand, Chinese firms fail to demonstrate a successful performance in international 
markets due their lack of the recombination capabilities with host CSAs. The relationship 
between Chinese firms’ FSAs and their performance makes great contribution to both IB theory 
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and the literature on EMNEs. Future empirical analysis with firm-level data on FSAs and 
performance is needed in order to shed new light into this important phenomenon.  
Third, we show that over-reliance on home country CSAs (e.g. large domestic market for 
sales, low-cost credit financing, and low-cost labour for manufacturing, etc.) as a source of 
advantages might eventually become a source of risks for Chinese firms. They might be less 
prepared to innovate and develop FSAs which are based on knowledge, information, and 
intellectual properties (e.g. advanced technology, global brands, and international managerial 
skills). The paradox is that they might be constrained in home country institutional deficiencies, 
which they seek to escape through internationalization in the first place (Witt & Lewin, 2007). 
Further research on the impact of home country CSAs on foreign performance of Chinese firms 
is needed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
New internalization theory with two dimensions of firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and home 
and host country-specific advantages (CSAs) are particularly valuable in explaining the 
internationalization and performance of Chinese MNEs. We find that there are relatively few 
Chinese manufacturing firms to be true MNEs by a basic definition (only 49 MNEs out of the 
largest 500 Chinese manufacturing firms). They rely on home country CSAs and government 
support rather than internationally transferrable FSAs to embark on internationalization. The 
cross-border expansion through acquisitions tends to yield non-sustainable FSAs. They have not 
yet developed new FSAs in combination with host CSAs. Consequently, their financial 
performance is poor relative to global peers using the industry financial data benchmarking 
method.  
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Table 1. List of the 10 most frequently studied Chinese firms  
No Firms Foreign 
sales/Total 
sales (F/T) 
Financial performance indicators Firm 
ratios 
Industry 
financial 
data 
Literature 
1 Huawei  66.59 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
7.84 
6.98 
0.28 
1.60 
1.38 
7.62 
14.13 
17.97 
0.27 
3.07 
2.60 
7.97 
Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Hennart, 2012; Luo et al., 2011; 
Parmentola, 2011; Rui & Yip 2008; Sun, 2009; Tylecote, 
Cai, & Liu, 2010; Zeng & Williamson, 2007 
 
2 Lenovo Group 57.00  Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
15.68 
1.86 
0.22 
1.02 
0.86 
3.86 
27.16 
16.98 
0.18 
1.66 
1.35 
19.26 
Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Chen & Young, 2010; Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007, 2009; Hashai & Buckley, 
2014; Hennart, 2012; Klossek,et al., 2012; Li, 2007b; 
Liu, 2007; Liu & Buck, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 
2006; Peng, 2012; Quelc & Knoop, 2006; Rui & Yip, 2008; 
Yang, Jiang, Kang, & Ke, 2009; Zeng & Williamson, 2007 
3 ZTE Corporation 53.12 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
19.35 
3.13 
2.11 
1.25 
1.05 
(2.57) 
14.13 
17.97 
1.38 
3.07 
2.60 
7.97 
Luo & Tung, 2007; Parmentola, 2011; Tylecote et al., 2010; 
Zeng & Williamson, 2007 
4 BOE Technology 
Group  
43.20 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
18.20 
4.36 
0.80 
2.21 
1.98 
1.92 
4.79 
(4.26) 
0.22 
2.64 
2.06 
3.24 
Deng, 2007, 2009; Liu & Buck 2009; Zeng & Williamson, 
2007 
5 TCL Corporation  37.43 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
12.25 
2.29 
2.54 
1.18 
0.89 
2.22 
3.71 
3.84 
0.23 
3.17 
2.41 
3.71 
Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2007, 2009; Hong & Sun, 
2006; Li, 2007b; Luo & Tung, 2007; Parmentola, 2011; 
Peng, 2012; Yang et al., 2009 
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Table 1. List of the 10 most frequently studied Chinese firms (continued) 
 
Notes: Data is from OneSource Database (by Thomson Reuters, Reuters Research Inc., published by Avention Inc., 2013, data as of March 31, 2013). Sales five-
year growth, and net profit margin for 5 year (%) are derived from the five-year period of 2008-2012; other company ratios are calculated from the 2012 data, 
with corresponding industry ratios reflecting ratios for 2012; data on F/T is from 2012 annual reports of the companies. 
No Firms Foreign 
sales/Total 
sales (%) 
Financial performance indicators Firm 
ratios 
Industry 
financial 
data 
Literature 
6 Wanxiang Group  15.09 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
n.a n.a He & Lyles, 2008; Warner et al., 2004; Zeng & Williamson, 
2007 
7 Haier Electronics 
Group 
11.40 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
22.06 
5.48 
0.96 
1.27 
1.06 
9.50 
8.96 
3.98 
0.55 
2.14 
1.32 
5.32 
Bonaglia et al., 2007; Child & Rodrigues 2005; Deng, 2007; 
Du, 2003; Duysters et al., 2009; Hashai & Buckley, 2014; 
Hennart, 2012; Hong & Sun, 2006; Klossek et al., 2012; Li, 
2007b; Liu & Li, 2002; Luo & Tung, 2007; Palepu et al., 
2005; Warner et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2009 
8 Shanghai 
Automotive 
Industry 
Corporation (SAIC) 
0.18 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
10.47 
4.18 
1.18 
1.21 
1.05 
0.24 
1.71 
7.41 
0.50 
1.64 
1.09 
0.82 
Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 2009; Rui & Yip, 2008 
9 Aviation Industry 
Corporation of 
China (AVIC) 
0.00 Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
23.50 
2.55 
n.a 
n.a 
n.a 
1.13 
7.46 
6.92 
1.38 
1.68 
0.85 
6.28 
Goldstein, 2006; Williamson & Zeng, 2009; Williamson & 
Raman, 2013; Zeng & Williamson, 2007 
10 Galanz Enterprise 
Group 
n.a Sales 5-year growth (%) 
Net profit margin for 5 year (%) 
Debt-to-equity 
Current ratio 
Quick ratio 
ROA (%) 
n.a n.a Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Ge & Ding, 2008 
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Table 2. The 49 Chinese manufacturing MNEs by F/T for 2012 
 Companies Rank 
in the 
500 
Revenues 
(US$ 
Billion) 
F/T 
(%) 
America 
% 
  
Europe  
% 
  
Asia 
% 
  
ROW 
% 
  
No. of foreign 
subsidiaries 
Industries 
the 
regions 
HK& 
Macao 
1 Suntech Power Holdings  238 334.82 88.20 23.00 45.50 20.70 10.80 6 2 Solar energy solutions 
2 Shenzhou International Group  431 149.40 80.10 8.10 20.70 51.30 19.90 7 4 Knitwear products 
3 LDK Solar  321 230.12 75.00 8.70 33.70 57.60   17 4 Solar energy solutions 
4 Huawei Technologies  15 3,368.91 66.59 14.46 35.16 50.38   14 3 Networking & telecommunications 
equipment and services 
5 Lenovo Group  18 3,024.45 57.00 15.00 21.00 64.00   31 6 Computers technology  
6 Zhejiang Wanfeng Auto Wheel  456 132.44 54.93         3 0 Aluminum alloy wheels for automobiles 
and motorcycles* 
7 ZTE Corporation  51 1,424.92 53.12   24.75 65.94 9.31 12 5 Telecommunications equipment and 
network solutions 
8 Ningbo Veken Elite Group  293 265.68 53.20         3 0 Home textiles, yarn, fabric and garments 
9 Eastcompeace Technology 413 100.94 47.26     6 1 Smart card products and system solutions 
10 Zhongjin Lingnan Nonfemet  253 308.41 45.84         4 2 Lead, zinc and other non-ferrous metals* 
11 Zhejiang Hailiang  72 1,120.01 44.32         5 1 Copper pipes and copper rods* 
12 GD Midea Holding Company 29 2,215.60 43.22         14 3 Consumer electronics and home 
appliances 
13 BOE Technology Group  343 210.49 43.20 3.67 8.46 87.75 0.12 5 0 Thin-film transistor-liquid crystal displays 
14 Lifan Industry Group 262 300.66 42.24         14 3 Motorcycles, automobiles and general gas 
engines 
15 TCL Corporation 80 1003.62 37.43     50 28 Electronics  
16 Zhejiang Sanhua  438 144.90 36.83     8 0 Refrigeration and air-conditioning control 
components* 
17 Hai Tian International Holdings  408 168.18 31.40         7 3 Plastic injection molding machines 
18 Western Mining Group  193 413.12 31.12         2 3 Alloy and metal minerals* 
19 Tsinghua Tongfang  225 346.29 29.05         24 5 Consumer electronics 
20 Accelink Technologies 381 184.95 27.62         2 1 Optical components* 
21 Sinopec Group 1 42,158.23 25.05         12 4 Oil refining and petrochemical products 
22 Guangxi Liugong Machinery  218 356.36 25.01         11 2 Construction machinery 
23 Shanghai Electric Group 42 1,533.72 23.40         12 2 Electrical equipment 
24 Hisense Electric Corporation  70 1,182.43 23.00         9 2 Home electrical appliances 
25 Shantui Construction 
Machinery  
309 242.88 22.50         4 2 Construction equipment 
26 Ningbo Huaxiang Electronic  491 108.12 21.45         5 0 Automobile components* 
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Table 2. The 49 Chinese manufacturing MNEs by F/T for 2012 (continued) 
Sources: Authors’ calculation. Note: (*) indicates material and component manufacturers, whereas the rest are final product manufacturers. 
 
 
  
 Companies Rank 
in the 
500 
Revenues 
(US$ 
Billion) 
F/T 
(%) 
Year  
2012 
America 
% 
  
Europe  
% 
  
Asia 
% 
  
ROW 
% 
  
No. of foreign 
subsidiaries 
Industries 
Other 
regions 
HK& 
Macao 
27 XCMG Construction Machinery  49 1,439.52 20.93         4 1 Construction machinery and equipment 
28 Sany Heavy Industry  60 1,324.90 19.42         13 2 Heavy machinery 
29 Shan Dong Sun Paper Industry  187 427.17 17.77         2 1 Paper  
30 Zhejiang Longsheng Group  285 273.26 17.62         8 5 Chemical products (e.g., textile 
chemicals, construction chemicals etc.) 
31 BYD Company  102 806.62 17.31 1.60 2.70 89.20 6.50 12 3 Automobiles and rechargeable batteries 
32 Wan Xiang Corporation  56 1,380.12 15.09     10 3 Automotive components* 
33 Taiyuan Heavy Industry  291 266.53 14.86     4 0 Heavy-duty machinery 
34 Yunnan Tin  221 349.60 14.82         2 1 Tin products  
35 Xingjiang TBEA Group  213 372.31 14.42         5 0 Electric power transmission and 
transformation equipment 
36 Shandong Chenming Paper 173 444.22 14.24         2 1 Paper  
37 Great Wall Motor  158 497.08 13.96         2 2 Automobile 
38 Xing Fa Group  383 184.47 13.90         2 1 Phosphates products and fine chemical 
products 
39 Guangdong Greatoo Molds  268 295.07 13.71         6 2 Tire mold 
 40 China Xd Electric  311 239.88 13.53         3 1 Electrical Machinery 
41 Sichuan Changhong Electric  65 1,264.67 13.41         7 1 Consumer electronics 
42 Huazhi Holding (Zhejiang)  355 200.84 12.90         4 0 Electric energy meters 
43 Hunan Valin Steel  55 1,387.10 13.26         2 1 Iron and steel products* 
44 Shandong Nanshan Aluminium  77 1,050.74 11.35         4 0 Aluminum products* 
45 Shougang Group 11 3,857.38 11.30         4 1 Iron and steel products* 
46 Haier Electronics Group 26 2,493.36 10.52         14 4 Consumer electronics and home 
appliances 
47 China CNR Corporation  47 1,474.15 10.50     2 1 Rail transportation equipment 
48 Baosteel Group 6 5,224.37 10.15     13 4 Iron and steel products* 
49 Brilliance China Automotive  48 1,445.58 10.09 4.09  94.41 1.50 8 0 Automobiles, micro-vans, and automotive 
components* 
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Table 3. 49 Chinese manufacturing MNEs by F/T for 2008 and 2012 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculation. 
 
  
 Companies F/T (%)  Companies F/T (%) 
2008 2012 2008 2012 
1 Suntech Power Holdings  93.00 88.20 26 Ningbo Huaxiang Electronic  1.63 21.45 
2 Shenzhou International Group  81.0 80.10 27 XCMG Construction Machinery  35.38 20.93 
3 LDK Solar  71.8 75.00 28 Sany Heavy Industry  29.17 19.42 
4 Huawei Technologies  60.39  66.59 29 Shan Dong Sun Paper Industry  2.78 17.77 
5 Lenovo Group  63.00 57.00 30 Zhejiang Longsheng Group  13.13 17.62 
6 Zhejiang Wanfeng Auto Wheel  60.69 54.93 31 BYD Company  14.80 17.31 
7 ZTE Corporation  60.57 53.12 32 Wan Xiang Corporation  0.84 15.09 
8 Ningbo Veken Elite Group  57.86 53.20 33 Taiyuan Heavy Industry  6.78 14.86 
9 Eastcompeace Technology 47.70 47.26 34 Yunnan Tin  27.95 14.82 
10 Shenzhen Zhongjin Linnan Nonfemet  18.21 45.84 35 Xingjiang TBEA Group  18.91 14.42 
11 Zhejiang Hailiang  69.81 44.32 36 Shandong Chenming Paper  13.32 14.24 
12 GD Midea Holding Company 36.29 43.22 37 Great Wall Motor  NA 13.96 
13 BOE Technology Group  50.24 43.20 38 Xing Fa Group  49.85 13.90 
14 Lifan Industry Group 46.58 42.24 39 Guangdong Greatoo Molds  14.60 13.71 
15 TCL Corporation 48.00 37.43  40 China Xd Electric  6.02 13.53 
16 Zhejiang Sanhua  51.25 36.83 41 Sichuan Changhong Electric  13.53 13.41 
17 Hai Tian International Holdings  38.74 31.40 42 Huazhi Holding (Zhejiang)  8.35 12.90 
18 Western Mining Group  3.64 31.12 43 Hunan Valin Steel  21.94 13.26 
19 Tsinghua Tongfang  13.89 29.05 44 Shandong Nanshan Aluminium  12.52 11.35 
20 Accelink Technologies 33.22 27.62 45 Shougang Group 1.48 11.30 
21 Sinopec Group NA 25.05 46 Haier Electronics Group 16.87 10.52 
22 Guangxi Liugong Machinery  13.28 25.01 47 China CNR Corporation  5.67 10.50 
23 Shanghai Electric Group 15.08 23.40 48 Baosteel Group 12.22 10.15 
24 Hisense Electric Corporation  19.91 23.00 49 Brilliance China Automotive 
Holdings 
NA 10.09 
25 Shantui Construction Machinery  23.40 22.50     
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Table 4. Financial benchmarking on the performance of Chinese manufacturing MNEs relative to 
the industry financial data 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Pair Sample Mean Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error mean 
Pair 1: Five-year sales growth (%) Chinese MNEs 
Industry financial data 
14.95 
9.37 
6.98 
7.53 
2.20 
2.38 
Pair 2: Net profit margin (%) Chinese MNEs 
Industry financial data 
2.87 
10.40 
2.61 
7.01 
0.82 
2.21 
Pair 3: Debt-to-equity ratio Chinese MNEs 
Industry financial data 
1.60 
0.59 
1.16 
0.44 
0.36 
0.14 
Pair 4: Current ratio Chinese MNEs 
Industry financial data 
1.25 
2.68 
0.46 
0.98 
0.14 
0.31 
Pair 5: Quick ratio Chinese MNEs 
Industry financial data 
1.03 
2.06 
0.47 
0.80 
0.15 
0.25 
Pair 6: Return on assets (ROA) Chinese MNEs 
Industry financial data 
1.90 
7.35 
4.03 
5.09 
1.27 
1.61 
Note: Data is from OneSource Database (by Thomson Reuters, Reuters Research Inc., published by Avention Inc., 2013, 
data as of March 31, 2013). 
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Table 5. Paired samples t-test 
Pair Sample Mean Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
error mean 
Correlation Significance 
(2-tailed) 
Pair 1: Five-year 
sales growth (%) 
Chinese MNEs - Industry financial 
data 
5.58 10.15 3.21 0.02 0.11 
Pair 2: Net profit 
margin (%) 
Chinese MNEs - Industry financial 
data 
-7.534 7.46 2.35 0.00 0.01 
Pair 3: Debt-to-
equity ratio 
Chinese MNEs - Industry financial 
data 
0.99 1.07 0.33 0.39 0.01 
Pair 4: Current 
ratio 
Chinese MNEs - Industry financial 
data 
-1.438 1.16 0.36 -0.19 0.00 
Pair 5: Quick 
ratio 
Chinese MNEs - Industry financial 
data 
-1.03 0.98 0.31 -0.11 0.00 
Pair 6: Return on 
assets (ROA) 
Chinese MNEs - Industry financial 
data 
-5.44 6.26 1.97 0.07 0.01 
Note: Data is from OneSource Database (by Thomson Reuters, Reuters Research Inc., published by Avention Inc., 2013, 
data as of March 31, 2013). 
 
 
 
